knows his supposition, and the doubter knows his doubt. The ignorant person may not know his ignorance. Whoever knows his ignorance possesses a knowledge by which he may be described.
Within it is knowledge of the wisdom of support: is it special care, the establishment of an argument, or special care in one place and the establishment of an argument in another, according to the states of two individuals?
Within it is knowledge of what is attributed to one who knows a thing, though his knowledge of it does not deserve that attribution, yet he attributes it to himself. An example is hope on the part of one who knows whether what he hopes for will occur or not. To what does hope attach when there is knowledge?
(Beneficence, Harm, and the Multiplicity of Faces)
Within it is knowledge of the wisdom of one who performs what is best without certainty concerning its fruit. Does this return to his knowing that the recipient of his beneficence is ignorant of the rank of beneficence, or to his own not knowing whether he fulfilled the due of beneficence toward him?
Within it is knowledge of the wisdom of torment and harm continuing upon the harmed, those possessing pains: is this out of mercy toward them or not?
Within it is knowledge of one who employs an affair outside what it was established for, or employs it only for what it was established for when it possesses many opposing faces. He has therefore not departed from the ruling belonging to it, as illness has a face toward patience and a face toward irritation.
Within it is knowledge of the forgetful person’s recollection: does his recollection benefit him or not?
