Manuscript volume 32 · Page 24

سبب الجمع فيها.

فهو الحفيظ بنفسه وبخلقه / وهو العليم بما له من حقه

(الإرادة والتعلق بالممكن)

بل وصف نفسه تعالى بالمشيئة والاختيار، أثبت بذٰلك عندنا شرعا لا عقلا إن له تصرفا في نفسه. وهٰذا حكم يحيله النظر العقلي بعين البصيرة على الله، ويصححه الخبر الشرعي والعين البصري في اختلاف الصور عليه التي يتجلى فيها.

وبه ثبت: ﴿يَمْحُوا الله ما يَشاءُ ويُثْبِتُ﴾ [الرعد: ٣٩]، و﴿إِنْ يَشَأْ يُذْهِبْكُمْ ويَأْتِ بِخَلْقٍ جَدِيدٍ﴾ [إبراهيم: ١٩]، و﴿لَوْ أَرادَ الله أَنْ يَتَّخِذَ وَلَداً لَاصْطَفى﴾ [الزمر: ٤]. ففي هٰذا كله وجه إلى أحدية متعلق الإرادة ووجه إلى التصرف في التعلق، والتصرف في التعلق تصرف في الإرادة.

والإرادة إما ذاته على مذهب نفاة الزائد، وإما صفته على مذهب مثبتي الصفات زائدة. والصحيح في غير هذين القولين، وهو أن الإرادة ليست بأمر زائد على الذات ولا هي عين الذات، وإنما هي تعلق خاص للذات، أثبته الممكن لإمكانه في القبول لأحد الأمرين على البدل.

لو لا معقولية هذين الأمرين ومعقولية القبول من الممكن ما ثبت للإرادة ولا للاختيار حكم، ولا ظهر له في العبارات اسم. فمن حضر مع الحق في

the reason for the plural concerning them.

He is the Preserver through Himself and His creation / And the Knowing concerning what belongs to Him of His right.

(Will and Attachment to the Possible)

Indeed, He described Himself, exalted is He, by will and choice, thereby establishing for us through Revealed Law, not reason, that He disposes of Himself. This is a ruling that rational consideration through the eye of inward sight deems impossible for God, while the report of the Revealed Law and the eye of outward sight affirm it through the different forms in which He discloses Himself.

Through this are established ‘God effaces what He wills and establishes’ [al-Ra‘d 13:39], ‘If He wills, He removes you and brings a new creation’ [Ibrahim 14:19], and ‘Had God wished to take a child, He would have chosen’ [al-Zumar 39:4]. All this has one aspect toward the oneness of will’s object, and another toward disposal over its attachment. Disposal over the attachment is disposal over will.

Will is either His Essence, according to those who deny anything additional, or His attribute, according to those who affirm attributes as additional. The correct position is other than these two: will is neither something added to the Essence nor the Essence itself. It is a particular attachment of the Essence, established by the possible because it can receive either of two things as alternatives.

Were it not for the intelligibility of these two things and of the possible’s receptivity, neither will nor choice would have an established ruling, nor would a name for it appear in expressions. Whoever is present with the Real in