The most specific attribute that is unique to divinity is that it is capable, since there is no ability for anything that is inherently possible, but rather it has the ability to accept the attachment of the divine influence to it

Algebra is not valid for the investigator because it contradicts the validity of the action for the servant. Algebra forces the possible to perform the action despite the existence of the negation of the possible. An inanimate object is not obligatory because an action is not conceivable from it nor does it have a normal mind. The possible is not obligatory because it does not conceive an action nor does it have a realizable mind with appearance. Its effects

Divinity decrees that there should be affliction and well-being in the world, so removing the avenger from existence is not better than removing the Forgiver, the Pardoner, and the Benefactor. If any of the names remained that have no ruling, it would be invalid, and disruption in divinity is impossible, so the absence of effect of the names is impossible

The perceiver and the perceiver are of two types: the perceiver knows and has the power of imagination, the perceiver knows and does not have the power of imagination, the perceiver with the opening of the r is of two types: the perceiver has an image. He who does not have the ability to imagine and does not imagine it knows it, and he knows it and imagines it. He who has the power of imagination, and the perceiver what has an image knows only.

Science is not the perception of the known, nor is it the meaning that imagines the known, for not every known thing imagines, nor does every knower imagine, for the perception of the world is only due to its being imagined, and the image for the known is to be in a state that imagination grasps, and then there is information that imagination does not grasp at all, so it is proven that it has no form < /p>

If the action is true, it is possible that it is true that it is capable and if it does not have action, then it has no power. Proving power for the possible is a claim without proof, and our discussion in this chapter is with the Ash’aris who affirm it while denying action for it.

Nothing emanates from the One in every respect except one. Is it then who is of this description or not? This is a matter for the fair person. The Ash’aris do not see that they established the creation of truth except from His being able, and the specialization from His being willed, and the rulings from His being a knower and the thing being willed. What is the essence of His Being Able? After this, their saying that He is One in every respect is not correct in general relation. How can they affirm the attributes as superfluous to the Essence and subservient to Him, the Most High? And so are those who believe in lineage and additions, and every group of the groups has not achieved unity in all aspects, except that they are clear and obligatory from His school of thought. By its absence, and the one who says it, the proof of oneness is only in divinity, that is, there is no god but Him, and that is correct and indicated .

The fact that the Creator is a living, knowledgeable, capable person has attributions and additions to all other attributes, not additional entities, which leads to describing it as imperfect, since the perfect by the excess is deficient in its essence from its perfection by the excess and is perfect in itself, so the excess by the essence over the essence is impossible, and attribution and addition are not impossible. As for the statement of the one who says, “Neither it is nor is it.” Other than Him, this is a very far-fetched statement, for the proponent of this doctrine demonstrated the affirmation of the superfluous, which is the other without a doubt, except that he denied this generalization and nothing else. Then he ruled on the definition by saying that the two other are those which it is permissible to separate one from the other in place, time, existence, and nonexistence, and this is not a definition for the other according to all scholars. With

The intrinsic qualities of the thing described, even if they are multiple, do not indicate the multiplicity of the thing described in itself, because they are the sum of its essence, even if they are reasonable in distinguishing one from the other .

The statement of the one who said: “Multipleness is only found from the first effect, and if it is one, three considerations are found in it, namely, its cause, its essence, and its possibility.” So we say to them that this requires you in the first cause. I mean that there are considerations in it, and it is one. Why do you prevent that only one issue from it? As for if you commit to the issue of multiplicity from the cause. The first, or one issuance of the first effect, and you do not say either of the two things .

Whoever is required to have self-perfection and intrinsic richness is not a cause of anything because his being a cause results in his being dependent on the effect, and the essence is free from being dependent on anything, so being a cause is impossible, but divinity may accept additions. If it is said that God is only applied to the one who has perfect essence and is rich. The essence does not mean addition or attribution. We said that there is no disagreement in the wording other than the cause, for it is in the origin of its position and from its meaning it calls for an effect. If what is meant by the cause is what this man meant by God, then he is a Muslim, and there remains no dispute in this wording except from the point of view of the Sharia: whether it prevents, permits, or remains silent .

Divinity is arranged for the self and no one deserves it except God, so she asked for what she asked for, and the divinity asks for it and she seeks it, and the self is in need of everything, so if this secret were revealed