Judging a thing that requires it for itself does not require the existence of its essence, nor is it necessary to estimate the existence of its essence. So, whether the eye does not exist or exists, the ruling on it is the same, whether it is pure or not, it does not matter whether it is in the knowledge of God or whether it exists in God. The same thing does not see what is possible. The probable has preferred its existence over its nonexistence or its nonexistence over its existence. However, he still does not adhere to the rule of possibility for him, and that possibility is obligatory for him in and of itself, just as referring to the impossible is obligatory for him in and of itself, just as the obligation for the obligatory is obligatory for him in and of itself, so the rationale for obligation applies to what is obligatory for himself. Likewise The ruling on the possible and the impossible does not change, even if the ranks differ.